General Equilibrium Theory and Group Formation

In this project, we analyze general equilibrium models with multi-member groups using three interacting mechanisms, each operating at a particular level of aggregation. Individual decisions are made to join or leave groups. Collective decisions within groups determine the consumption plans of group members. Competitive exchange across groups achieves a feasible allocation of resources. We study the effects of these interdependencies in the context of households and firms.

Publications:

• Bargaining cum Voice, Social Choice and Welfare, 36(2), 2011, 199-225
  (Hans Gersbach and Hans Haller)
• Club Theory and Household Formation, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 46, 2010, 715-724
  (Hans Gersbach and Hans Haller)
• Groups, Collective Decisions, and Markets, Journal of Economic Theory, forthcoming, 2010.
  (Hans Gersbach and Hans Haller)
• The Affectionate Society: Does Competition for Partners Promote Friendliness?, Economic Theory, 40, 2009, 389-403.
  (Hans Gersbach and Hans Haller)
  Working Paper Version: available here
• Bargaining Power and Equilibrium Consumption, Social Choice and Welfare, 33(4), 2009, 665-690
  (Hans Gersbach and Hans Haller).
  Working Paper Version: click here
• Household Ineffciency and Equilibrium Efficiency, in: Schultz, Christian and Karl Vind (eds.), Institutions, Equilibria and Efficiency: Essays in Honor of Birgit Grodal, Springer, Heidelberg, 2006, 187-209
  (Hans Gersbach and Hans Haller)
• When Inefficiency Begets Efficiency, Economic Theory, 25(1), 2005, 105-121.
  (Hans Gersbach and Hans Haller)
  Working Paper Version: available here
• Collective Decisions and Competitive Markets, Review of Economic Studies, 68, 2001, 347-368.
  (Hans Gersbach and Hans Haller)
• Allocation Among Multi-member Households: Issues, Cores, and Equilibria, in Ahmet Alkan, C. Charalambos, D. Aliprantis und N.C. Yannelis (eds.), Current Trends in Economics. Theory and Applications. (Studies in Economic Theory Vol. 8), Springer, 1999.
  (Hans Gersbach and Hans Haller)

Working Papers:

• Club Theory and Household Formation
  (Hans Gersbach and Hans Haller)
• Exit and Power in General Equilibrium
  (Hans Gersbach and Hans Haller)
• A Human Relations Paradox
  (Hans Gersbach and Hans Haller)
• Hierarchical Trade and Endogenous Price Distortions
  (Hans Gersbach and Hans Haller)
• Voice and Bargaining Power
  (Hans Gersbach and Hans Haller)
• Clubs and Households
  (Hans Gersbach and Hans Haller)
• Hold-Up Problems and Firm Formation
  (Hans Gersbach and Hans Haller)
• Beware of Workaholics: Household Preferences and Individual Equilibrium Utility
  (Hans Gersbach and Hans Haller)
• General Equilibrium with Multi-Member
  Households and Production
  (Hans Gersbach and Hans Haller)

Team Member: Hans Gersbach

Cooperation Partner: Hans Haller (Department of Economics, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University)